Assessing avionics-based GNSS integrity augmentation performance in UAS mission- and safety-critical tasks by Sabatini, Roberto et al.
Assessing Avionics-Based GNSS Integrity
Augementation Performance in UAS
Mission- and Safety-Critical Tasks
Roberto Sabatini1, Terry Moore2, Chris Hill2 and Subramanian Ramasamy1
1School of Aerospace, Mechanical and Manufacturing Engineering, RMIT University,
Melbourne, VIC 3000, Australia
2Nottingham Geospatial Institute, University of Nottingham,
Nottingham, NG7 2TU, UK
Abstract—The integration of Global Navigation Satellite
System (GNSS) integrity augmentation functionalities in
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) has the potential to provide
an integrity-augmented Sense-and-Avoid (SAA) solution
suitable for cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios. In this
paper, we evaluate the opportunities offered by this
integration, proposing a novel approach that maximizes the
synergies between Avionics Based Integrity Augmentation
(ABIA) and UAS cooperative/non- cooperative SAA
architectures. When the specified collision risk thresholds are
exceeded, an avoidance manoeuvre is performed by
implementing a heading-based differential geometry or
pseudospectral optimization to generate a set of optimal
trajectory solutions free of mid-air conflicts. The optimal
trajectory is selected using a cost function with minimum time
constraints and fuel penalty criteria weighted for separation
distance. The optimal avoidance trajectory also considers the
constraints imposed by the ABIA in terms of UAS platform
dynamics and GNSS satellite elevation angles (plus jamming
avoidance when applicable), thus preventing degradation or
loss of navigation data during the Track, Decision and
Avoidance (TDA) process. The performance of this Integrity-
Augmented SAA (IAS) architecture was evaluated by
simulation case studies involving cooperative and non-
cooperative platforms. Simulation results demonstrate that the
proposed IAS architecture is capable of performing high-
integrity conflict detection and resolution when GNSS is used
as the primary source of navigation data.
Keywords—Avionics Based Integrity Augmentation,
Unmanned Aircraft, Sense-and-Avoid, Obstacle Detection,
Obstacle Avoidance and Global Navigation Satellite System.
I. INTRODUCTION
The integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
into non-segregated airspace presents a series of safety
challenges [1]. One of the main challenges is the provision of
a certifiable Sense- And-Avoid (SAA) capability. In addition
to Space Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS) and Ground
Based Augmentation Systems (GBAS), Global Navigation
Satellite System (GNSS) another form of augmentation has
been developed that exploits the information provided by
other avionic systems. In most cases, the additional avionic
systems operate via separate principles than the GNSS and,
therefore, are not subject to the same sources of error or
interference. A system such as this is referred to as Avionics-
Based or Aircraft-Based Augmentation System (ABAS). The
ABAS approach is particularly well suited to increase the
levels of integrity and accuracy (as well as continuity in
multi-sensor data fusion architectures) of GNSS in a variety
of mission- and safety-critical aviation applications. In
Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) applications, airworthiness
requirements for both cooperative and non-cooperative
Sense-and-Avoid (SAA) impose stringent GNSS data
integrity requirements. Therefore, a properly designed and
certifiable Avionics Based Integrity Augmentation (ABIA)
capability would allow an extended spectrum of autonomous
and safety-critical operations by continuously monitoring
GNSS integrity levels and providing suitable caution and
warning signals to the remote pilot or to the avionics flight
control systems in order to accomplish GNSS-based mission
and safety-critical tasks. This increased level of integrity
could provide a pathway to support the unrestricted access of
UAS to commercial airspace. Although current and likely
future SBAS/GBAS augmentation systems can provide
significant improvement of GNSS navigation performance, a
properly designed and flight certified ABAS/ABIA system
could play a key role in GNSS integrity augmentation for
aviation safety-critical applications, including UAS SAA.
Furthermore, using suitable data link and data processing
technologies on the ground, a certified ABAS capability
could be a core element of a future GNSS Space-Ground-
Avionics Augmentation Network (SGAAN).
II. ABIA SYSTEM RESEARCH
Previous research on ABIA systems demonstrated the
potential of this technology to enhance GNSS integrity
performance in a variety of mission- and safety-critical
applications including experimental flight test/flight
inspection, precision approach and automatic landing [2-5].
Therefore, an advanced ABIA system was developed for
UAS applications (Fig. 1). In this system, the on-board
sensors provide information on the aircraft relevant flight
parameters (navigation data, engine settings, etc.) to an
Integrity Flag Generator (IFG), which is also connected to
the GNSS system. Using the available data on GNSS and
the relevant Unmanned Aircraft (UA) flight parameters,
integrity signals are generated which can be sent to the UAS
Ground Control Station (GCS) or used by a Flight Path
Optimisation Module (FPOM). This system addresses both
the predictive and reactive nature of GNSS integrity
augmentation by producing suitable integrity flags (cautions
and warnings) in case of predicted/ascertained GNSS data
losses or unacceptable signal degradations exceeding the
Required Navigation Performance (RNP) specified for each
phase of flight, and providing guidance information to the
remote pilot/autopilot to avoid further data
losses/degradations.
Fig. 1. ABIA system architecture for UAS applications.
To achieve this, the Integrity Flag Generator (IFG) module
produces the following integrity flags [2-4]:
 Caution Integrity Flag (CIF): a predictive annunciation
that the GNSS data delivered to the avionics system is
going to exceed the RNP thresholds specified for the
current and planned flight operational tasks (alert status).
 Warning Integrity Flag (WIF): a reactive annunciation
that the GNSS data delivered to the avionics system has
exceeded the RNP thresholds specified for the current
flight operational task (fault status).
The following definitions of Time-to-Alert (TTA) are
applicable to the ABIA system [2-4]:
 ABIA Time-to-Caution (TTC): the minimum time
allowed for the caution flag to be provided to the user
before the onset of a GNSS fault resulting in an unsafe
condition.
 ABIA Time-to-Warning (TTW): the maximum time
allowed from the moment a GNSS fault resulting in an
unsafe condition is detected to the moment that the
ABIA system provides a warning flag to the user.
III. ABIA INTEGRITY FLAG GENERATOR
The main causes of GNSS data degradation or signal
losses in aviation applications were deeply analysed in [2]
and are listed below:
 Antenna obscuration (i.e., obstructions from the wings,
fuselage or empennage during maneuvers);
 Adverse satellite geometry, resulting in high Position
Dilution of Precision (PDOP);
 Fading, resulting in reduced carrier to noise ratios
(C/N0);
 Doppler shift, impacting signal tracking and
acquisition/reacquisition time;
 Multipath effects, leading to a reduced C/N0 and to
range/phase errors;
 Interference and jamming.
Understanding the physics of these phenomena and
developing reliable mathematical models was essential in
order to properly design the ABIA IFG module [2]. Fig. 2
shows the architecture of the IFG module and its interfaces.
Fig. 2. ABIA IFG module architecture.
The The ABIA IFG module is designed to provide CIF
and WIF alerts in real-time (i.e., in accordance with the
specified TTC and TTW requirements in all relevant flight
phases). IFG module inputs are from the GNSS receiver and
other aircraft sensors. The GNSS and Sensors Layer (GSL)
passes the aircraft Position, Velocity, Time (PVT) and
attitude (Euler angles) data (from the on board Inertial
Navigation Systems, Air Data Computer, etc.), GNSS data
(raw measurements and PVT) and the Flight Control System
(FCS) actuators data to the Data Extraction Layer (DEL). At
this stage, the required Navigation and Flight Dynamics
(NFD) and GNSS Constellation Data (GCD) are extracted,
together with the relevant information from an aircraft
Three-Dimensional Model (3DM) and from a Terrain and
Objects Database (TOD). The 3DM database is a detailed
geometric model of the aircraft built in a Computer Aided
Three-dimensional Interactive Application (CATIA). The
TOD uses a Digital Terrain Elevation Database (DTED) and
additional manmade objects data to obtain a detailed map of
the surfaces neighbouring the aircraft. In the Integrity
Processing Layer (IPL), the Doppler Analysis Module
(DAM) calculates the Doppler shift by processing the NFD
and GCD inputs. The Multipath Analysis Module (MAM)
processes the 3DM, TOD, GNSS Constellation Module
(GCM) and A/C Navigation/Dynamics Module (ADM)
inputs to determine multipath contributions from the aircraft
(wings/fuselage) and from the terrain/objects close to the
aircraft. The Obscuration Analysis Module (OAM) receives
inputs from the 3DM, GCS and ADS, and computes the
GNSS antenna obscuration matrices corresponding to the
various aircraft manoeuvres. The Signal Analysis Module
(SAM) calculate the link budget of the direct GNSS signals
received by the aircraft in the presence of atmospheric
propagation disturbances (C/N0), as well as the applicable
radio frequency interference and Jamming-to-Signal ratio
(J/S) levels. The Integrity Flags Layer (IFL) uses a set of
predefined CIF/WIF threshold parameters to trigger the
generation of both caution and warning flags associated
with antenna obscuration, Doppler shift, multipath, carrier,
interference and satellite geometry degradations. The
approach adopted to set-up thresholds for the ABIA CIF and
WIF integrity flags is depicted in Fig. 3. Both Scalar
Tracking Loops (STL) and Vector Tracking Loops (VTL)
are considered.
Fig. 3. Integrity flag thresholds.
The masking integrity flag criteria are the following:
 When the current aircraft manoeuvre will lead to less the
4 satellite in view, the CIF shall be generated.
 When less than 4 satellites are in view, the WIF shall be
generated.
Additionally, when only four satellites are in view:
 When one (or more) satellite(s) elevation angle (antenna
frame) is less than 10 degrees, the caution integrity flag
shall be generated.
 When one (or more) satellite(s) elevation angle is less
than 5 degrees, the warning integrity flag shall be
generated.
From the definition of Dilution of Precision (DOP)
factors, GNSS accuracy can be expressed by [6]:
σ୔ = DOP × σ୙୉ୖ୉ (1)
where σ୔ is the standard deviation of the positioning
accuracy and σ୙୉ୖ୉ is the standard deviation of the satellite
pseudorange measurement error. For the C/A-code σ୙୉ୖ୉ is
in the order of 33.3m. Therefore, the 1-sigma Estimated
Position, Horizontal and Vertical Errors of a GNSS receiver
can be calculated using the PDOP (EPE in 3D), the HDOP
(EHE in 2D) or the VDOP (EVE). In order to generate
CIFs and WIFs that are consistent with current GNSS RNP,
we need to introduce the Horizontal and Vertical Accuracy
(HA/VA) requirements in the various flight phases. The
Horizontal Alert Limit (HAL) is the radius of a circle in the
horizontal plane, with its centre being at the true position,
which describes the region which is required to contain the
indicated horizontal position with the required probability
for a particular navigation mode. Similarly, the Vertical
Alert Limit (VAL) is half the length of a segment on the
vertical axis, with its centre being at the true position, which
describes the region which is required to contain the
indicated vertical position with the required probability for a
particular navigation mode. As a result of our discussion,
the DOP integrity flags criteria are the following:
 When the EHE exceeds the HA 95% or the VA 95%
alert requirements, the CIF shall be generated.
 When the EHE exceeds the HAL or the EVE exceeds
the VAL, the WIF shall be generated.
During the landing phase, a GNSS Landing System
(GLS) is augmented by GBAS in order to achieve RNP
levels, as well as Lateral and Vertical Protection Levels
(LPL and VPL). LPL/VPL is defined as the statistical error
value that bounds the Lateral/Vertical Navigation System
Error (NSE) with a specified level of confidence. In
particular, Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) allows
for multiple Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS)
reference receivers (up to four) to be implemented. The
lateral and vertical accuracy (NSE 95%) and alert limits
required by a GLS in the presence of LAAS, considering the
continuously varying position of the aircraft with respect to
the Landing Threshold Point (LTP) are given in [7].
Additionally, [7] provides the so-called Continuity of
Protection Levels in terms of Predicted Lateral and Vertical
Protection Levels (PLPL and PVPL). Although the
definition in [7] is quite comprehensive, a generic statement
is made that the PVPL and PLPL computations shall be
based on the ranging sources expected to be available for the
duration of the approach. In other terms, it is implied that
the airborne subsystem shall determine which ranging
sources are expected to be available, including the ground
subsystem’s declaration of satellite differential correction
availability (satellite setting information). Unfortunately, this
generic definition does not address the various conditions for
satellite signal losses associated to specific aircraft
manoeuvres (including curved GLS precision approaches).
Therefore, it is suggested that an extended definition of
PLPL and PVPL is developed taking into account the
continuously varying aircraft-satellite relative geometry
(masking envelope). In particular, when the current aircraft
manoeuvre will lead to less than 4 satellites in view or
unacceptable accuracy degradations, the CIF shall be
generated. Under these assumptions, the criteria for
producing SBAS/GBAS CIFs and WIFs are:
 When the PLPLGBAS/SBAS exceeds LPL or PVPLGBAS/SBAS
exceeds the VPL, the CIF shall be generated.
 When the LPLGBAS/SBAS exceeds the LPL or the
VPLGBAS/SBAS exceeds the VPL, the WIF shall be
generated.
Multipath integrity flags were defined using the Early-
Late Phase (ELP) observable and the range error [8]. As
described in [3], the multipath integrity flags criteria are the
following:
 When the ELP exceeds 0.1 radians, the caution integrity
flag shall be generated.
 When the multipath range error exceeds 1 meter, the
warning integrity flag shall be generated.
In order to define the integrity thresholds associated with
Doppler and fading effects, a dedicated analysis of the GNSS
receiver tracking performance was required. When the
GNSS measurement errors exceed certain thresholds, the
receiver loses lock to the satellites. Since both the code and
carrier tracking loops are nonlinear, especially near the
threshold regions, only Monte Carlo simulations of the
GNSS receiver in different dynamics and Signal-to-Noise
Ratio (SNR) conditions can determine the receiver tracking
performance [6, 9, 10]. Nevertheless, some conservative
rule of thumbs that approximate the measurement errors of
the GNSS tracking loops can be used. Numerous sources of
measurement errors affect the Phase Lock Loop (PLL) and
the Frequency Lock Loop (FLL). However, for our
purposes, it is sufficient to analyze the dominant error
sources in each type of tracking loop. Considering a typical
GNSS receivers employing a two-quadrant arctangent
discriminator, the PLL threshold is given by [6]:
3σ୔୐୐ = 3σ୨+ θୣ ≤ 45
° (2)
where:
σ୨ = 1-sigma phase jitter from all sources except dynamic
stress error;
θୣ = dynamic stress error in the PLL tracking loop.
Frequency jitter due to thermal noise and dynamic stress
error are the main errors in a GNSS receiver FLL. The
receiver tracking threshold is such that the 3-sigma jitter
must not exceed one-fourth of the frequency pull-in range of
the FLL discriminator. Therefore, the FLL threshold is [6]:
3σ୊୐୐ = 3σ୲୊୐୐ + fୣ ≤ 1/4T (Hz) (3)
where:
3σ୊୐୐ = 3-sigma thermal noise frequency jitter;
σ୲୊୐୐ = dynamic stress error in the FLL tracking loop.
Regarding the code tracking loop, a conservative rule-of-
thumb for the Delay Lock Loop (DLL) tracking threshold is
that the 3-sigma value of the jitter due to all sources of loop
stress must not exceed the correlator spacing (d), expressed
in chips. Therefore [6]:
3σୈ୐୐ = 3σ୲ୈ୐୐ + Rୣ ≤ d (chips) (4)
where:
σ୲ୈ୐୐ = 1-sigma thermal noise code tracking jitter;
Re = dynamic stress error in the DLL.
The Phase Lock Loop (PLL), FLL and DLL error models
described in [2] allow determining the C/N଴ corresponding
to the receiver tracking thresholds. The integrity flag
criterion applicable to the ABIA system is:
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where:(C/N଴)୔୐୐= Minimum C/N଴ for PLL tracking;(C/N଴)୊୐୐= Minimum C/N଴ for FLL tracking;(C/N଴)ୈ୐୐= Minimum C/N଴ for DLL tracking.
Numerical solutions of Eqs. (3), (4) and (5) show that the
weak link in unaided avionics GNSS receivers is the carrier
tracking loop threshold (greater sensitivity to dynamics
stress). Therefore, the (C/N଴)୔୐୐ threshold can be adopted
in these cases. In general, when the PLL loop order is made
higher, there is an improvement in dynamic stress
performance. Therefore, third order PLL are widely adopted
in avionics GNSS receivers. Assuming 15 to 18 Hz noise
bandwidth and 5 to 20 msec predetection integration time
(typical values for avionics receivers), the rule-of-thumb
tracking threshold for the PLL gives 25 to 28 dB-Hz.
Additionally, in aided avionics receiver applications, the
PLL tracking threshold can be significantly reduced by using
external velocity aiding in the carrier tracking loop. With
this provision, a tracking threshold of approximately 15 to 18
dB-Hz can be achieved. Using these theoretical and
experimental threshold values, we can also calculate the
receiver Jamming-to-Signal (J/S) performance for the
various cases of practical interest, as described in [3]. When
available, flight test data collected in representative portions
of the aircraft operational flight envelope (or the results of
Monte Carlo simulation) shall be used. Taking an additional
5% margin on the 3-sigma tracking thresholds for the CIF,
the following additional criteria are introduced for the ABIA
integrity thresholds:
 When either 42.25° ≤ 3σ୔୐୐ ≤ 45° or 0.2375T ≤
3σ୊୐୐ ≤ 0.25T or 0.05d ≤ 3σୈ୐୐ ≤ d, the CIF shall be
generated.
 When either 3σ୔୐୐ > 45°or 3σ୊୐୐ > 1/4T or 3σୈ୐୐ >d the WIF shall be generated.
In avionics receivers, lock detectors are used to assess if
the satellite signals are being tracked or not tracked. Code
lock detection is very similar to estimating the receivedC/N଴, inferring that the receiver is operating on or near the
correlation peak. Knowledge of code lock is obviously
parallel to the knowledge of received signal power. The
receiver’s code-correlation process has to raise the signal out
of the noise. The spread spectrum processing gain (G୮) is
defined as the ratio of the spread bandwidth to the unspread
(baseband) bandwidth and is expressed in dB. The post-
correlation signal-to-noise ratio can be calculated by:(S/N)୮୭ୱ୲ି ୡ୭୰୰. = (S/N)୮୰ୣ ିୡ୭୰୰. + G୮ (6)
When the receiver code is aligned with the transmitted
code, the signal power at the band pass output is crushed
into approximately 100 Hz of bandwidth. The processing
gain can be calculated from:G୔ = 10 logቀଶେ౎୘ీ ቁ(dB) (7)
where CR is the chipping rate and TD is the data period. For
the C/A-code this works out to be about 43 dB. The
TORNADO-IDS receiver has a cut off value at 10 dB, which
means that if the value is less than this the satellite signal
level is too low to be used in the positioning computations
[11]. Therefore, an additional threshold to be accounted for
is: S/N୮୭ୱ୲ି ୡ୭୰୰. = S/N୮୰ୣ ିୡ୭୰୰. + G୮ ³ 10 dB (8)
During experimental flight test activities performed with
unaided L1 C/A code avionics receivers, it was also found
that, in a variety of dynamics conditions, a C/N଴ of 25 dB-
Hz was sufficient to keep tracking of the satellites [12].
Consequently, taking a 2 dB margin for the CIF, the
following additional criteria are adopted for the TORNADO
S/N integrity flags:
 When the C/N଴ is less than 27dB-Hz or the difference
between the S/N and the processing gain is less than 12
dB, the CIF shall be generated.
 When the C/N଴ is less than 25dB-Hz or the difference
between the S/N and the processing gain is less than 10
dB, the WIF shall be generated.
Interference detection in a GNSS receiver is typically
performed based on a number of parameters including
output power, variance and standard deviation of the output
power (correlated), carrier phase uncertainty and Automatic
Gain Control (AGC) values. The key component to detect
interference in the received signal is the Automatic Gain
Control (AGC). In order to minimize the signal loss, the
amplitude of the received GNSS signal is tuned to the ADC
range. The gain in AGC drops significantly when there is an
increased power in the GNSS bandwidth. The chirp signals
are predominantly used for jamming in the recent times.
Chirp signals are typically sinusoidal or cosine signals with
sweeping of frequency within in-band GNSS frequency
ranges. The chirp signals are modelled using a periodic
Frequency Modulated (FM) signal and can be expressed as
[12, 13]:x(t) = asin(2π෍ (න fଵ (tᇱ୲
଴
ஶ
୦ୀ଴
− h. Tୱ,ଵ). dtᇱ+⋯
+∫ f୬ (tᇱ−୲଴ h. Tୱ,୬). dtᇱ)) (9)
where fଵ(tᇱ− h. Tୱ,ଵ) is the 1st saw tooth function,f୬(tᇱ− h. Tୱ,୬) is the nth saw tooth function, Tୱ,୬ is the sweep
time. A number of algorithms have been proposed for
jamming detection, localisation and characterisation of
interfering signals. Considering a GNSS jammer transmitting
chirp signals (with zero mean) from a random position, the
received signal can be expressed as [14]:s୰(t) = s୲(t)ට( ୡ୤ౙ.ସ஠.ୢ)஑. e୨ଶ஠୤ౙୢ/ୡ (10)
where s୲(t) is the transmitted jammer signal, fୡ is the carrier
signal, d is the distance between the jammer and the
receiver, α is the path loss and c is the speed of light. In order
to improve the hostile effects of GNSS in electronic warfare
and terrorist attacks, new generation signals are being
introduced. These signals inherently possess higher precision
of orientation and anti-jamming performance, and are also
compatible existing GNSS signals. Binary Offset Carrier
(BOC) modulation is introduced to increase the ERP for anti-
jamming performance without affecting the existing GNSS
signals. In these cases, Costas loop is used as carrier tracking
loop to receive BOC modulated signals. When a jamming
signal interferes with the GNSS signal, phase measurement
error increases beyond a specified threshold value and as a
consequence the tracking loop loses lock. The design of the
GNSS antenna generally provides a superior polarization
signal reception and poor low elevation angle gain. As a
result of superior polarisation, cross polarisation reception is
less than - 10dBic and thus effectively reduces unwanted
signal reflections. In order to design GNSS receivers against
interference, bandwidth, sampling and hardware
considerations are taken into account. In order to increase the
accuracy of the signal, narrow correlator spacing is
employed by sharpening up the auto correlation function.
Therefore, it is ensured that the correlators are still operating
in a linear range. Noise increases due to the increase in pre-
correlation bandwidth but it can effectively tackled by
employing superior digital signal processing algorithms.
Generally, the signal processor adopted has the capability of
performing code correlation in two different modes: an early
minus-late power mode and a dot-product mode. The signal
processor has two correlators in each channel and can
operate one of the correlators as an early or an early-minus-
late correlator. The normalised dot-product discriminator is
given by [14]:
dτ = ౛୍ష౅୍ ౌ
ା୕౛ష౅୕ౌ
୍ౌ మା୕ౌ
మ (11)
where I and Q values are summed over the Prediction
Integration Interval (PDI). Iୣି ୍ and Qୣି ୍ represent the I and
Q values when the hardware in implemented in the dot-
product mode. P stands for I and Q and are similar to the
ones used in carrier loop discriminators. For an infinite pre-
correlation bandwidth, the normalised Early-minus-Late
(EL) discriminator has an output at high values of SNR and
the estimation is given by:
E(dτ) =
ସ(ଶିୢ)த(ଶିୢ)మାସதమ chips, -d/2≤ ߬≤ d/2 (12)
where τ is the tracking error and d is the EL discriminator
spacing in chips. The standard deviation of the pseudorange
observations (σத) is estimated from the discriminator output
standard deviation (σୢ) and is given by:
σத = √ଶ୘୆ୋౚ σୢ (13)
where Gୢ is the gain of the discriminator and B is the
bandwidth. For example, for a loop bandwidth of 1/30 Hz,
the resulting σத is approximately 0.3 cycles. In avionics
receivers, lock detectors are used to assess if the satellite
signals are being tracked or not tracked. Code lock
detection is adopted, which is very similar to estimating the
received C/N଴, inferring that the receiver is operating on or
near the correlation peak. The code-correlation process of
the receiver is designed to increase the signal strength when
compared to that of inherent and added noise. The spread
spectrum processing gain (G୮) is defined as the ratio of the
spread bandwidth to the unspread (baseband) bandwidth and
is expressed in dB. The post-correlation S/N is given as:(S/N)୮୭ୱ୲ି ୡ୭୰୰. = (S/N)୮୰ୣ ିୡ୭୰୰. + G୮ (14)
When the receiver code is aligned with the transmitted
code, the signal power at the band pass output is crushed
into approximately 100 Hz of bandwidth. The processing
gain can be calculated from:G୔ = 10 logቀଶେ౎୘ీ ቁ[dB] (15)
where Cୖ is the chipping rate and Tୈ is the data period. For
the C/A code this works out to be about 43 dB. Typical
avionics receivers have a cut off value at 10 dB, which
means that if the value is less than this the satellite signal
level is too low to be used in the positioning computations
[14]. An additional threshold criterion to be accounted for in
the ABIA system is given as:S/N୮୭ୱ୲ି ୡ୭୰୰. = S/N୮୰ୣ ିୡ୭୰୰. + G୮ ³ 10 dB (16)
 When G୮ is more than 11 dB (margin of 1 dB), the CIF
shall be generated.
 When G୮ is less than 9 dB (margin of 1 dB), the WIF
shall be generated.
IV. ABIA FLIGHT PATH OPTIMISATION MODULE
Optimising a trajectory for integrity based navigation is
a standard optimisation problem that can be solve like all
optimal control problem using a variety of direct or indirect
derived methods. The optimisation problem is depicted in
Fig. 4. All the standard components of an optimization
problem are used. A flight dynamic model of the aircraft
gives the dynamic constraints and allows creating a
trajectory that will be flyable by the aircraft. The integrity
degradations and the current GNSS parameters define a
certain number of path constraints. They ensure that
integrity degradations will be avoided on the whole
trajectory. Then boundary conditions include minimal,
maximal, initial and final values for the entire state and
command variable. They are given by the aircraft sensors,
which relate the current flight parameters, and by the Flight
Management System (FMS), which gives the information
from the flight plan. The cost function is the performance
criterion to minimize. All the necessary constraint for the
integrity degradations are already included in the path
constraint, therefore the time is minimized. This choice is
made for simplicity and because only the integrity
navigation optimization is considered in this research, but
more complex criterion could be set based on aircraft
performances.
Fig. 4. Trajectory optimization problem.
The Aircraft Dynamics Model (ADM) used is a three
dimensional symmetric flight, unsteady model. A 3-Degree
of Freedom (3-DoF) model with variable mass is adopted.
The majority of the GNSS integrity degradations depend on
the relative position of the GNSS receiver antenna and each
satellite. The relative movement between the GNSS receiver
antenna and the satellite is also crucial. Therefore
degradations related to one satellite do not affect the system
with the same manner or intensity as the others. A loss of
integrity occurs if a combination of several degradations
from different satellites takes place at the same instance.
The CIF/WIF thresholds defined for the antenna
obscuration, Doppler shift, multipath, carrier, interference
and satellite geometry degradations are precisely capable of
detecting combination of such degradations. A potential CIF
or WIF is produced based on the current values of the
aircraft flight parameters (position, Euler angles, and
velocity), the satellite parameters (position and velocity),
and the given thresholds [3]. An individual CIF or WIF is
produced with respect to each satellite of the constellation.
An overall CIF is triggered if there are less than 5 satellites
remaining without an individual CIF and an overall WIF is
triggered if less than 4 satellites are remaining without an
individual WIF. The flight path optimisation algorithm is
initiated when degradation in integrity is predicted or
detected by the IFG. The logical steps involved are listed
below:
 Step 1: The satellites in view that remain without an
individual integrity flag are selected and their data are
extracted (position, elevation, azimuth and other
information).
 Step 2: For each selected satellite, the type of flag is
analysed:
- If the flag is not due to Doppler shift, the minimum
elevation limit is set with the current selected
satellite’s elevation angle.
- If the flag is due to Doppler shift, the sign of the
azimuth angle is compared to the sign of the bank
angle. If the satellite is located in the same direction
of the track, the minimum elevation limit is set with
the current satellite’s elevation value. If the satellite
is located in the opposite direction of the track, the
maximum elevation limit is set with the current
satellite’s elevation value.
 Step 3: After the satellite elevation limits are set, the
parameters are used in the trajectory optimization suite.
V. ABIA/SAA SYSTEMS INTEGRATION
Both cooperative and non-cooperative SAA systems are
being developed to address UAS safe integration into the
non-segregated airspace [1]. The SAA capability can be
defined as the automatic detection of possible conflicts (i.e.,
collision threats) by the UA platform and the implementation
of avoidance manoeuvres to prevent the identified collision
threats. An analysis of the available SAA candidate
technologies and the associated sensors was presented in
[15]. An approach to the definition of encounter models and
their applications on the SAA strategies is presented in
[15, 16] considering both cooperative and non-cooperative
scenarios. As part of our research, the possible synergies
attainable with the adoption of different detection, tracking
and trajectory generation algorithms were studied.
Additionally, the error propagation from different sources
and the impacts of host and intruders dynamics on the
ultimate SAA solution were investigated [15]. SAA system
requirements can be derived from the current regulations
applicable for the human pilot see-and-avoid capability
[17-22]. The proposed ABIA/SAA integrated architecture is
illustrated in Fig. 5. The Position, Velocity and Attitude
(PVA) measurements are typically obtained by adopting
multi-sensor data fusion techniques [23 -25]. An initial flight
path is generated using the aircraft dynamics model. The IFG
module run is performed on that trajectory. Based on a
Boolean decision logic that sorts sensors’ data based on
estimated performance parameters, the C-SAA or non-
cooperative SAA sensors are used for safe separation. If both
the safe separation thresholds are violated and a mid-air
collision threat is detected the WIF is generated. To prevent
any WIF, the flight path optimization process starts when the
first CIF is generated. Pseudo-Spectral Optimisation (PSO)
and Differential Geometry Optimization (DGO) techniques
are used to generate a new optimised trajectory free of any
integrity degradations. Depending on the relationship
between the available time-to-collision and the computation
time PSO and DGO trajectory solutions, the optimised
trajectory data are sent to the AFCS (and/or to the ground
pilot) for execution of the avoidance manoeuvres. In the
trajectory optimisation process time is used as the cost
functional and the aircraft dynamics model/satellite
elevations are used as path constraints. The selection of the
optimal trajectory from the generated set of safe trajectories
is performed, which is then fed to the aircraft guidance
subsystems. The implemented decision logic is based on
minimisation of the following cost function [26, 27]:J = w୲∙ tୗ୅୊୉ + w୤න [SFC ∙ T(t)]dt − wୢ ∙ D୫ ୧୬ +
− w୧ୢ ∙ ∫D(t)dt (17)
where:
 D(t) is the estimated distance of the generated avoidance
trajectory points from the avoidance volume associated
with the obstacle.
 D୫ ୧୬ = min[D(t)] is the estimated minimum distance of
the avoidance trajectory from the avoidance volume.
 tୗ୅୊୉ = t|ୈౣ ౟౤ is the time at which the safe avoidance
condition is successfully attained.
 SFC [୩୥
୒
∙ s] is the specific fuel consumption.
 T(t) is the thrust profile.
 w୲ , w୤, wୢ, w୧ୢ are the weightings attributed to time,
fuel, distance and integral distance respectively.
Fig. 5. ABIA/DAA integrated architecture.
VI. SIMULATION ACTIVITIES
A number of simulation case studies were performed to
evaluate the performance of the ABIA/SAA integrated
architecture. A GNSS constellation simulator was
implemented to support GNSS satellite visibility, signal and
geometry analysis. Using CATIA-P3, a detailed aircraft 3-
Dimensional Model (3DM) was developed and an Aircraft
Dynamics Simulator (ADS) was implemented to generate
the nominal flight path trajectory and Euler angles. Terrain
and Objects Data (TOD) was used to run the MPS and using
a DTED, it a detailed map of the terrain beneath the aircraft
was obtained. Providing the aircraft trajectory inputs from
the ADS module, terrain elevation data were automatically
extracted and fed to the TOM module where they are
integrated with the database of man-made objects (e.g.,
buildings). The Doppler Simulator Module (DSM) was used
to calculate the Doppler shift by processing ADS and GCS
inputs. The Multipath Analysis Module (MAM) processed
the 3DM, TEM, GCS and ADS inputs to determine
multipath contributions from the aircraft (wings/fuselage)
and from the terrain/objects close to the aircraft. The
Obscuration Analysis Module (OAM), and was used to
compute the GNSS antenna(e) masking matrixes for all
aircraft manoeuvres with inputs from the 3DM, GCS and
ADS. The nominal link budget of the direct GNSS signals
received by the aircraft in the presence of ionospheric and
tropospheric propagation disturbances was evaluated using
SAM. The Integrity Flags Simulator (IFS) used a set of
predefined threshold parameters to trigger the generation of
both caution and warning flags associated with antenna
obscuration, Doppler shift, multipath, SNR and satellite
geometry degradations. The GNSS constellation simulator
(GCS) was developed to calculate GNSS satellite position
and velocity in the Earth-Centred Earth-Fixed (ECEF)
reference frame and to obtain satellite visibility data. The
satellite position and velocity are calculated from the
Kepler's laws of orbital motion using either the YUMA or
SEM almanac data [28, 29]. Various geometric parameters
were extracted from the literature to draw a detailed CATIA
model of the AEROSONDE UA [30-34]. The ABIA
integration into an existing UAS SAA architecture was
studied in cooperative and non-cooperative SAA scenarios.
The ABIA host platform used in the simulation was the
AEROSONDE UA and the intruders platforms included
AIRBUS 320 (A320) and AEROSONDE UAs. The AMMs
in pitch and roll are generated calculating all possible
intersections of the aircraft body (all triangular surfaces)
with the LOS antenna-satellites (Fig. 6).
Fig. 6. AEROSONDE masking profile simulation.
In all the simulated scenarios, an avoidance volume (sum
of navigation and tracking errors) was generated by the SAA
system [15]. Pseudospectral (PSO) or constrained differential
geometric optimization (DGO) techniques were used to
generate the new trajectory based on the available time to
conflict (host entering the avoidance volume). The avoidance
trajectory was initiated by the SAA system when the
probability of collision exceeded the required threshold
value. Time and fuel were used in the cost functional, the
dynamic model as dynamic constraint, and the elevation
criteria as path constraints for both PSO and DGO
techniques. Boundary conditions were set from the value of
the flight parameters at CIF time step. Fig. 7 illustrates the
cooperative SAA test scenario wherein AEROSONDE
(ABIA host platform) UA and two intruders (AEROSONDE
UAs) are on the same FL. One intruder UA is 90° off track
and the other is on a head-on collision with the host UA. The
horizontal and vertical separation obtained with respect to
intruder 1 and 2 are illustrated in Fig. 8 and 9 respectively.
Three different points are shown on the ABIA/SAA host
platform trajectory in Fig. 7:
 SAA Break-off Point: Corresponding to the point where
the host UA initiates the avoidance trajectory
(commanded by the SAA system). The cost function
criteria adopted in this case is minimum time.
 SAA Safe Manoeuvring Point: Corresponding to the
point where the host RPAS can manoeuvre safely (any
manoeuvre within its operational flight envelope) has 0
ROC. From this point onwards the SAA cost function
criteria switches to minimum time and minimum fuel to
get back on the original (desired) track.
 ABIA Re-join Point: corresponding to the point where
the host UA re-joins the original (desired) track without
GNSS data degradations.
SAA Break-off Point
SAA Safe Manoeuvring Point
ABIA Re-join Point
Host Platform ABIA/DAA
Intruder Platform
Fig. 7. Cooperative SAA scenario (3UAS).
The simulation results demonstrate that the ABIA IFG
module is capable of generating integrity flags to provide
both caution and warning signals when GNSS signals are
degraded or lost. After the integrity caution flag is generated,
the time available for the pilot/autopilot to react (before the
integrity event is detected and the warning flag is generated),
is at least 2 seconds. This TTC can support safety-critical
tasks including GLS curved/segmented precision approach
and automatic landing applications. Data analysis showed
that the ABIA system can provide useful integrity signals for
CAT-III precision approach and automatic landing.
Fig. 8. Obtained horizontal and vertical separation of intruder 1.
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Fig. 9. Obtained horizontal and vertical separation of intruder 2.
In the C-SAA and N-SAA scenarios investigated and in
the dynamic conditions explored, all near mid-air collision
threats were successfully avoided by implementing adequate
trajectory optimisation algorithms. Both PSO and DGO
algorithms proved successful in C-SAA and N-SAA
scenarios depending on the available time for the
optimisation loops (distance host-intruders and relative
dynamics). Simulation case studies to evaluate the
performance of the proposed GNSS ABIA integrity
augmentation strategy were performed in a number of test
platforms (3-DoF and 6-DoF aircraft dynamics models)
including AIRBUS 320 (A320), TORNADO-IDS and
AEROSONDE UA. In all scenarios including multipath
environments [15], an overall avoidance volume is generated
based on the SAA Unified Method (SUM) proposed in [15].
Time and fuel are used in the cost functional, the aircraft
dynamics model produces the dynamics constraints, and the
satellite elevation criteria are used to set path constraints for
both PSO and DGO techniques [5]. Based on the obtained
position uncertainty about the host manned aircraft or UA
trajectory, an optimised avoidance trajectory without any
GNSS data losses is constructed around the overall
avoidance volume obtained by combining the jamming
signal radiation pattern and navigation error of the host
platform. The optimised avoidance trajectory is constructed
tangential to the radiation pattern of the jammer (main lobe
in the case of directional jammer). The optimised avoidance
trajectory obtained in the presence of a directional jammer is
illustrated in Fig. 10.
Directional
Jammer
Main Lobe
Aircraft Trajectory
Position
Uncertainty
Fig. 10. Avoidance trajectory in the presence of directional jammer.
The results of a simulation performed in
MATLAB/Simulink for the directional jammer case are
illustrated in Fig. 11. The AEROSONDE 6-DoF dynamics
model is used for this case study. After jamming detection
and generation of a CIF, an optimised avoidance trajectory is
generated. This is based on the cost function approach
defined earlier and the constraints imposed by ABIA in
terms of UA platform dynamics and GNSS satellite elevation
angles. The avoidance trajectory guarantees jamming
avoidance while preventing degradation or losses of GNSS
navigation data.
Fig. 11. Trajectory in the presence of directional jammer.
VII. SIMULATION ACTIVITIES
The synergies between a GNSS Avionics Based Integrity
Augmentation (ABIA) system and a novel Unmanned Aerial
System (UAS) Sense-and-Avoid (SAA) architecture for
cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios were explored.
The integration of ABIA with SAA leads to an Integrity
Augmented SAA (IAS) solution supporting the efforts
towards a safe and unrestricted access of UAS to commercial
airspace. The ABIA and SAA research activities were
presented and a detailed ABIA/SAA integrated architecture
was established. Simulation case studies were performed for
IFG, IFG/FPM and ABIA/SAA modules. According to the
simulation results, after the integrity caution flag is
generated, the time available for the pilot/autopilot to react
(before the integrity warning flag is generated), is sufficient
for safety-critical tasks including GLS curved/segmented
precision approach and automatic landing applications. The
ABIA integration into an existing UAS SAA architecture
proved that all near mid-air collision threats were
successfully avoided by implementing trajectory
optimisation algorithms. The proposed ABIA/SAA
integration architecture can achieve adequate performance
by avoiding critical satellite signal losses while fulfilling the
separation requirements for SAA. Current research is
extending the ABAS/ABIA concepts to the Aeronautical
Data Link (ADL) application domain, also investigating
ABIA LOS and BLOS communications interfaces for UAS
applications. Additionally, ABIA evolutions for Next
Generation Flight Management Systems (NG-FMS) and
ground-based Four-Dimensional Trajectory (4DT) Air
Traffic Management (ATM) systems are being addressed
[35-39]. Finally, possible extensions of the ABIA concept to
aviation mission planning and forensic (accident
investigation) applications are being investigated.
REFERENCES
[1] T.P. Spriesterbach, K.A. Bruns, L.I. Baron, and J.E. Sohlke,
“Unmanned Aircraft System Airspace Integration in the National
Airspace Using a Ground-Based Sense and Avoid System,” Johns
Hopkins APL Technical Digest, vol. 32, no. 3, 2013.
[2] R. Sabatini, T. Moore, and C. Hill, “A New Avionics Based GNSS
Integrity Augmentation System: Part 1 – Fundamentals,” Journal of
Navigation, vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 363-383, May 2013. DOI:
10.1017/S0373463313000027
[3] R. Sabatini, T. Moore, and C. Hill, “A New Avionics Based GNSS
Integrity Augmentation System: Part 2 – Integrity Flags,” Journal of
Navigation, vol. 66, no. 4, pp. 511-522, June 2013. DOI:
10.1017/S0373463313000143
[4] R. Sabatini, T. Moore, C. Hill, “A Novel GNSS Integrity
Augmentation System for Civil and Military Aircraft,” International
Journal of Mechanical, Aerospace, Industrial and Mechatronics
Engineering, Vol. 7, No. 12, pp. 1433-1449, International Science
Index, December 2013.
[5] R. Sabatini, T. Moore, and C. Hill, “Assessing GNSS Integrity
Augmentation Techniques in UAV Sense-and-Avoid Architectures,”
Sixteenth Australasian Aerospace Congress, Melbourne, Australia,
2015. DOI: 10.13140/2.1.2586.4480
[6] E.D. Kaplan and C.J. Hegarty, “Understanding GPS: Principles and
Applications,” Artech House, Second Edition, 2006.
[7] RTCA DO-245A, “Minimum Aviation System Performance
Standards for Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS),” Dec 2004.
[8] O.M Mubarak and A.G Dempster, “Analysis of Early Late Phase in
Single and Dual Frequency GPS Receivers for Multipath Detection,”
The University of New South Wales (Australia), 2010. Available at
http://www.gmat.unsw.edu.au/snap/staff/omer_mubarak.htm.
[9] P. Ward, “Using a GPS Receiver Monte Carlo Simulator to Predict
RF Interference Performance,” Proceedings of 10th International
Technical Meeting of The Satellite Division of The Institute of
Navigation, Kansas City, MO, pp.1473–1482, September 1997.
[10] P. Ward, “GPS Receiver RF Interference Monitoring, Mitigation, and
Analysis Techniques,” NAVIGATION, Journal of the Institute of
Navigation, vol. 41, no. 4 (Winter), pp. 367-391, 1994-95.
[11] M.S. Braasch, “On the Characterization of Multipath Errors in
Satellite-based Precision Approach and Landing Systems,” College of
Engineering and Technology, Ohio University, June 1992.
[12] R. Sabatini and G. Palmerini, “Differential Global Positioning System
(DGPS) for Flight Testing,” NATO Research and Technology
Organization (RTO) – Systems Concepts and Integration Panel (SCI),
AGARDograph Series RTO-AG-160, vol. 21, Oct 2008.
[13] S.B. Hottman, K.R. Hansen, and M. Berry, “Literature Review on
Detect, Sense, and Avoid Technology for Unmanned Aircraft
Systems,” Tech. Report DOT/FAA/AR-08/41, US Department of
Transport, USA, 2009.
[14] R. Sabatini, S. Ramasamy, T. Moore, and C. Hill, “Avionics-Based
GNSS Integrity Augmentation Performance in a Jamming
Environment,” Proceedings of the 16th Australian International
Aerospace Congress (AIAC16), Melbourne, Australia, February
2015. DOI: 10.13140/2.1.4683.6000
[15] S. Ramasamy, R. Sabatini, and A. Gardi, “Towards a Unified
Approach to Cooperative and Non-Cooperative RPAS Detect-and-
Avoid,” Proceedings of the Fourth Australasian Unmanned Systems
Conference 2014 (ACUS 2014), Melbourne, Australia, 2014. DOI:
10.13140/2.1.4841.3764
[16] P. Rodriguez, R. Sabatini, A. Gardi and S. Ramasamy, “A Novel
System for Non-Cooperative UAV Sense-and-Avoid,” Proceedings of
European Navigation Conference 2013, Vienna, Austria, 2013.
[17] M.J. Kochenderfer, L.P Espindle, J.D. Griffith, and J.K Kuchar,
“Encounter Modeling for Sense and Avoid Development,” Paper
presented at Integrated Communications, Navigation and Surveillance
Conference (ICNS), pp. 1-10, 2008. DOI:
10.1109/ICNSURV.2008.4559177
[18] Federal Aviation Administration, “Pilot's Role in Collision
Avoidance,” AC90-48C, Washington DC, USA, 1983.
[19] C.G. Prévost, A. Desbiens, E. Ganon, and D. Hodouin, “UAV
Optimal Obstacle Avoidance while Respecting Target Arrival
Specifications,” Preprints of the 18th IFAC World Congress, Milano,
Italy, pp. 11815-11820, 2008.
[20] DOT/FAA/CT-96-1, “Human Factors Design Guide for Acquisition
of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf Subsystems,” Non-Developmental
Items, and Developmental Systems-Final Report and Guide, 1996.
[21] P. Cornic, P. Garrec, S. Kemkemian, and L. Ratton, “Sense and
Avoid Radar using Data Fusion with Other Sensors,” Paper presented
at the IEEE Aerospace Conference, Big Sky, USA, March 2010. DOI:
10.1109/AERO.2011.5747514
[22] J. Lai, J.J Ford, L. Mejias, P. O'Shea, and R. Walker, “See and Avoid
Using Onboard Computer Vision,” Sense and Avoid in UAS
Research and Applications, Plamen Angelov (ed.), John Wiley and
Sons, West Sussex, UK, 2012.
[23] R. Sabatini, S. Ramasamy, A. Gardi, and L.R. Salazar, “Low-cost
Sensors Data Fusion for Small Size Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Navigation and Guidance,” International Journal of Unmanned
Systems Engineering, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 16-47, August 2013.
[24] R. Sabatini, C. Bartel, A. Kaharkar, T. Shaid, and S. Ramasamy,
“Navigation and Guidance System Architectures for Small
Unmanned Aircraft Applications,” International Journal of
Mechanical, Aerospace, Industrial and Mechatronics Engineering,
vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 733-752, International Science Index, April 2014.
[25] R. Sabatini, F. Cappello, S. Ramasamy, A. Gardi, and R. Clothier,
“An Innovative Navigation and Guidance System for Small
Unmanned Aircraft using Low-Cost Sensors,” In press, Aircraft
Engineering and Aerospace Technology, Emerald, 2015.
[26] R. Sabatini, A. Gardi, and S. Ramasamy, “A Laser Obstacle
Detection and Avoidance System for Unmanned Aircraft Sense-and-
Avoid,” Applied Mechanics and Materials, vol. 629, pp. 355-360,
2014. DOI: 10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.629.355
[27] R. Sabatini, A. Gardi, and M. A. Richardson, “LIDAR Obstacle
Warning and Avoidance System for Unmanned Aircraft”,
International Journal of Mechanical, Aerospace, Industrial and
Mechatronics Engineering, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 62-73, 2014.
[28] YUMA GPS Almanacs. Available at: http://www.celestrak.com/
GPS/almanac/Yuma/definition.asp.
[29] SEM GPS Almanacs. Available at: http://www.celestrak.com/
GPS/almanac/SEM/definition.asp.
[30] Anonymous, “Aircraft Drawings”. Available at http://
www.aircraftdrawindsdownload.com.
[31] M.T. Burston, R. Sabatini, R. Clothier, A. Gardi, and S. Ramasamy,
“Reverse Engineering of a Fixed Wing Unmanned Aircraft 6-DoF
Model for Navigation and Guidance Applications,” Applied
Mechanics and Materials, vol. 629, pp. 164-169, 2014. DOI:
10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.629.164
[32] R. Sabatini, M.A. Richardson, C. Bartel, A. Kaharkar, T. Shaid, L.
Rodriguez, and S.Ramasamy, “A Low-cost Vision Based Navigation
System for Small Size Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Applications,”
Journal of Aeronautics and Aerospace Engineering, vol. 2, no. 3,
May 2013. DOI: 10.4172/2168-9792.1000110
[33] R. Sabatini, A. Kaharkar, C. Bartel, and T. Shaid, “Carrier-phase
GNSS Attitude Determination and Control for Small UAV
Applications,” Journal of Aeronautics and Aerospace Engineering,
vol. 2, no. 4, July 2013. DOI: 10.4172/2168-9792.1000115
[34] R. Sabatini, L. Rodríguez, A. Kaharkar, C. Bartel, and T. Shaid,
“Carrier-phase GNSS Attitude Determination and Control System for
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Applications,” ARPN Journal of Systems
and Software, vol. 2, issue 11, pp. 297-322, 2012.
[35] S. Ramasamy, R. Sabatini, A. Gardi, and T. Kistan, “Next Generation
Flight Management System for Real-Time Trajectory Based
Operations”, Applied Mechanics and Materials, vol. 629, pp. 344-
349, 2014. DOI: 10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.629.344
[36] A. Gardi, R. Sabatini, S. Ramasamy, and T. Kistan, “Real-Time
Trajectory Optimisation Models for Next Generation Air Traffic
Management Systems”, Applied Mechanics and Materials, Vol. 629,
pp. 327-332, 2014. DOI: 10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.629.327
[37] S. Ramasamy, R. Sabatini, and A. Gardi, “Novel Flight Management
Systems for Improved Safety and Sustainability in the CNS+A
Context”, Proceedings of Integrated Communication, Navigation and
Surveillance Conference (ICNS 2015), Herndon, VA, USA, 2015
[38] A. Gardi, R. Sabatini, T. Kistan, Y. Lim, and S. Ramasamy, “4-
Dimensional Trajectory Functionalities for Air Traffic Management
Systems”, Proceedings of Integrated Communication, Navigation and
Surveillance Conference (ICNS 2015), Herndon, VA, USA, 2015.
[39] K. Chircop, D. Zammit-Mangion, R. Sabatini, “Bi-Objective
Pseudospectral Optimal Control Techniques for Aircraft Trajectory
Optimisation,” Proceedings of 28th International Congress of the
Aeronautical Sciences (ICAS 2012), Brisbane, Australia, September
2012.
